Collective confessions are a crucial matter: firstly, because they are the most distinctive comparison instrument between societies; secondly because they hide important dimensions of religious reality (Vilaça, 2001). The declared religion essentially means a feeling of cultural belonging, which is not necessarily related to orthodox faith itself. Being born Portuguese still means, for the great majority (86%), being born Catholic. The declared confession is in a certain sense a cultural indicator, while the religious practice reveals the degree of integration in church and an expression of religious involvement and socialization.
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In spite of that, Portuguese society, in line with western predominant tendencies, prefigured a progressively diverse religious world. The roots of this transition go back to the end of the 19th century but the social and public impact has been particularly visible only over last three decades. Although the statistical importance of established groups and movements is insignificant, the symbolic and media weight is indisputable.
The novelty of phenomenon imposes an incursion by the historically predominant traces, which configured the Portuguese religious frame. We will begin with a statistical approach based on the inventories of the population. In 1900-according to the information gathered during the monarchy and during a time when Catholicism was "the religion of the Kingdom"-national identity coincides with religious identity: the number of Catholics was 99.9% (Table 1) . Four decades later, there was a decrease of Catholics in over 6 %, and an increase of persons "without religion" by 4.5%. These figures related to atheism and agnosticism reveal above all the consequences of secularist and anticlericalist education of the First Republic in the 40's generations. 1900, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1981, 1991 Contrary to predominant tendencies in other countries of the European continent and to tendencies which would come to nourish the thesis of secularization; in 1950 and in 1960 an increase of the Catholic population takes place. Beginning with a percentage of 93% in 1940, the number of Catholics increased to 96% in 1950 and to 98% in 1960. Oppositely, those "without religion", which had been ignored in 1950, diminished by almost 3% in comparison to 1940. The incorrectness of data relating to the Census of 1950 and 1960 suggests a clear interference in the production of information during the New State-a type "of symbolic power" exercised by the manipulation of data-and the need to use Catholicism as the ideological legitimization of Salazar dictatorship (Esteves, 1986; Vilaça, 2006) .
It is only after the revolution of April 1974 that we witness a reversal in the increase of the total number of Catholics in inventories. Between 1960 and 1981 the Catholic population drops from 98% to 81%, thus showing a decrease of 17%. From 1981 to 1991 there is only a decrease of 3%. However, in 2001 the percentage of Catholics stabilizes in 85%, partly due to the lower number of non-respondents and a better quality data collection in the census.
In geographical terms, the Portuguese religious map continues along the same lines: the north and the islands (Azores and Madeira) are regions with a higher number of well brought-up Catholics but mem-
